Jakarta (ANTARA News) – Vice President Jusuf Kalla said the military Hercules plane crash in Magetan, East Java, on Wednesday was due to insufficient funds for the purchase of military armament system (alutsista) equipment.

“It is because of the insufficient portion of funds for the purchase of the country`s military hardware,” the vice president said here on Wednesday in comment on the military Hercules plane crash in Magetan.

According to the vice president, most of the Air Force`s armament system equipment was old because they were bought during the era of former military chief, the late General M Jusuf.

Therefore, Jusuf Kalla said more funds for “alutsista” would be made available in the near future.

“The funds for military hardware will be made available soon, and I guarantee it,” the vice president said, while expressing his deepest condolences to the families of the crash victims.

He said sufficient funds for the provision of Hercules planes was necessary because such a type of the aircraft was not only used in war but also in humanitarian missions in times of peace.

However, Jusuf Kalla`s remark differed from a statement made by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who said the government had never restricted funds to cover the military`s operational expenditures and the maintenance of the military hardware.

President Yudhoyono said what the government had done was only to postpone the purchase of military hardware that was not urgently needed.

The president said the military Hercules transport plane which crashed in Magetan on Wednesday morning was still airworthy.

With 112 people on board, the ill-fated plane was on a flight from Jakarta to Madiun, East Java, when it crashed into a rice field and burst into flames, killing at least 78 people and injuring 19 others. (*)

COPYRIGHT © 2009

JAKARTA (AFP) — At least 64 people were killed when an Indonesian military transport plane crashed in East Java, staff at a military hospital said. Television footage showed the burning wreckage of the Hercules scattered in rice paddies in Magetan, about 160 kilometres (100 miles) east of Yogyakarta. At least 64 people were killed including five on the ground, media reports said. “The plane hit some houses, bounced, hit the ground and then caught fire,” one witness told Metro TV. East Java military chief Suwarno told the state-run Antara news agency that the aircraft was carrying 98 passengers and 14 crew. The crash occurred as the plane was preparing to land at Iswahyudi military airbase, Antara reported. It is the second accident involving an Indonesian air force Hercules in two weeks, after one overshot the runway of Wamena airport in Papua on May 10. One person was reportedly injured in that incident. In response to the Wamena accident, the air force said it would check its Hercules fleet, which is being upgraded with airframe and engine capability improvements. Early last month, 24 military personnel died when their Fokker 27 training aircraft careered into a hangar and burst into flames at an air base in West Java. Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelegic nation and relies heavily on air travel, but accidents are common and its commercial airlines are banned from flying in European Union airspace for safety reasons. Copyright © 2009 AFP. All rights reserved. More »

Jakarta (ANTARA News) – An Air Force Hercules plane flying from Jakarta to Madiun, East Java, crashed into a rice field at Geplak village in Magetan at about 6:20 on Wednesday morning, or a few minutes before landing at Iswahyudi military airbase.

Air Force spokesman Rear Marshal Bambang S told a private television station that a Hercules aircraft of the Air Force did crash in Madiun on Wednesday morning.

But so far there was no immediate report on the number of casualty in the accident.
Wednesday`s crash in Madiun is the second in less than two weeks after another Air Force Hercules plane overshot the runway of Wamena airport in Papua on Monday, May 10, 2009. (*)

[JAKARTA] Putusan majelis hakim yang menolak gugatan Kejaksaan Agung (Kejagung) terhadap mantan Presiden Soeharto secara perdata terkait penyelewengan dana pada yayasan yang dipimpin (Ketua) Soeharto, merupakan putusan yang aneh. “Secara logika sederhana saja, putusan itu aneh,” kata Ketua Badan Pengurus Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (YLBHI), Patra M Zen, kepada SP, di Jakarta, Jumat (28/3) pagi.

Menurut Patra, semua hal yang dilakukan pengurus Yayasan Supersemar, terutama meminjamkan uang kepada sejumlah perusahaan, pasti dilaporkan terlebih dahulu kepada Soeharto sebagai ketua yayasan atau pembina yayasan. “Jadi kalau pihak yayasan terbukti melawan hukum, maka Soeharto juga terbukti melakukan perbuatan melawan hukum,” kata Patra.

Untuk itu, Patra meminta Kejagung agar mengajukan banding atas putusan majelis hakim yang aneh itu. “Saya minta Komisi Yudisial (KY) agar periksa majelis hakim kasus ini,” kata Patra.

Majelis hakim Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Selatan yang diketuai Wahjono, memutuskan menolak gugatan Kejagung terhadap mantan Presiden Soeharto secara perdata terkait penyelewengan dana pada yayasan yang dipimpin mantan penguasa Orde Baru itu. Menurut majelis hakim, Soeharto tidak terbukti melakukan perbuatan melawan hukum.

“Tergugat I (Soeharto, Red) tidak terbukti melakukan perbuatan melawan hukum. Oleh karena itu, para ahli warisnya juga tidak melakukan perbuatan melawan hukum,” kata Wahjono dalam putusannya di Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Selatan, Kamis (27/3).

Majelis hakim menilai, Soeharto sebagai pendiri dan ketua yayasan telah mempertanggungjawabkan perbuatannya kepada seluruh pengurus yayasan dan pertanggungjawaban itu diterima. “Jika sudah dilaporkan, maka dia bebas karena telah mempertanggungjawabkan,” kata Wahjono.

Sebagaimana diberitakan, Kejagung menggugat Soeharto (tergugat I) dan Yayasan Beasiswa Supersemar (tergugat II) secara perdata terkait penyelewengan dana pada yayasan itu.

Kejagung sebagai penggugat menuntut agar tertuntut mengembalikan dana yang diselewengkan senilai US$ 420 juta dan Rp 185,92 miliar. Selain itu, tergugat juga harus mengganti kerugian imateriil Rp 10 triliun.

Sementara tergugat II, kata majelis hakim, yakni Yayasan Supersemar terbukti bersalah melakukan perbuatan melawan hukum, yakni menyalahgunakan dana dengan cara memberi pinjaman dan menyertakan modal ke berbagai perusahaan. Oleh karena itu tergugat II, harus membayar ganti rugi kepada pemerintah sebesar 25 persen dari tuntutan ganti rugi yang diajukan pemerintah, yakni US$ 420 juta dan Rp 185 miliar.

Puas

Menurut majelis hakim, yayasan tidak membantah telah memberikan sejumlah dana kepada beberapa perusahaan untuk dipinjamkan dan penyertaan modal. Atas putusan tersebut, yayasan supersemar melalui kuasa hukumnya, Juan Felix Tampubolon menyatakan banding. Sementara jaksa pengacara negara (JPN), Dachamer Munthe, menyatakan pikir-pikir.

Seusai sidang, Dachamer mengatakan, pihaknya cukup puas dengan putusan tersebut. “Kita cukup puas, karena yang kita nyatakan dalam gugatan kita terbukti,” kata dia.

Dachamer mengaku tidak mengerti putusan majelis hakim yang mewajibkan tergugat II cuma membayar 25 persen dari yang dituntut. Kejagung dalam gugatannya, menyatakan, Soeharto dan Yayasan Supersemar terbukti melakukan pembiaran atas dana yayasan yang tidak digunakan untuk kegiatan sosial. Tindakan pembiaran itu seperti pinjaman uang Rp 150 miliar kepada PT Kiani Lestari tanpa jaminan dan Kiani hanya mengembalikan Rp 37,5 miliar.

Yayasan Supersemar juga menyertakan modal kepada PT Sempati Air. Selain Kiani dan Sempati, kata Dachamer, dana Yayasan Supersemar juga mengalir ke Yayasan Kosgoro dan beberapa perusahaan lainnya, seperti Kalhold Utama, Nusamba Grup dan Kiani Sakti. [E-8]

SP Daily: Last modified: 28/3/08

Tempo Magazine
No. 23/VIII
February 05-11, 2008

Cover Story

The families of activists abducted during the New Order era continue to demand that the former rulers be brought to court.

TRY Suharto….hang Suharto…take him to court,” shouted activists and members of the Indonesian Association of Missing Persons (Ikohi), dragging an effigy of former President Suharto in an iron cage. They walked 2 kilometers from the National Monument to the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) office in Menteng, Central Jakarta.

Even though Suharto was no longer in power for years, the families of the kidnap victims continued to demand that he be held accountable for his actions. They are the parents and families of abducted people whose fates remain unknown. According to Ikohi leader, Mugiyanto, they believe that Suharto was aware of how dissenters were eliminated.

“In an interview with Panjimas magazine, former Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command) Commander Prabowo Subianto claimed he was given a list of the names of 28 activists that he had to monitor. Suharto also gave the list to other military officials. Those people on the list are still missing,” said Mugiyanto.

According to Mugiyanto, there were three distinct periods when activists and dissenters went missing during Suharto’s rule. The first period was when the 1997 General Elections had to be ’secured.’ At that time, the PDI and PPP coalition, calling themselves the “Mega Star”, was getting stronger. During this period, the targets were supporters or people close to the two political parties opposing Golkar, Suharto’s political vehicle. The victims then were Yani Afri and Soni, activists of the PDI, and Dedi Hamdun and Noval Alkatiri of the PPP.

The second period was just before the MPR general session. Pius Lustrilanang, Desmond Junaidi Mahesa, Haryanto Taslam, and activists of the People’s Democratic Party (PRD) such as Nezar Patria, Rahardjo Waluyo Jati, Andi Arif, Feisol Reza, Wiji Tukul and Mugiyanto himself, were victims of “forcible elimination” attempts.

These nine were later set free, but not before they were terrorized and tortured. “I was held for three days, given electric shocks, tortured, then taken to the police station for three months detention,” said Mugiyanto, 32. Mugi was then a student at Gadjah Mada University’s Department of English Literature in Yogyakarta.

Rahardjo Waluyo Jati went through a similar experience. “For the first three days during the kidnapping I was handcuffed, my legs were tied, given electric shocks and beaten. I was even stripped naked and placed on a block of ice,” he said, when testifying to Komnas HAM. Jati was held from March 12 to April 28, 1998. After three days, Jati was moved to a dungeon where he met Pius Lustrilanang, an activist from Bandung. According to Pius, Room 5 was once inhabited by Soni and Yani Afri, supporters of the pro-Megawati PDI, Dedi Hamdun (of the PPP) and Lukas, a university lecturer from East Timor. In the dungeon, Jati was visited by two persons. “Maybe the bosses of the kidnappers. They smelt of expensive perfume. The two were accompanied by five others. All of them wore masks,” he recounted.

In the third period, people went missing following the May 1998 riots. “They were the eyewitnesses who saw a coordinated group of people torching the markets or malls when many looters were still inside,” said Mugi. Not all the victims of kidnappings were political activists. Some were ordinary street singers and office employees, among whom were Ucok Munandar, Yadi and Abdul Nasser. “Their whereabouts remain unknown but some people saw them being forcibly taken away,” he said.

According to Mugi, Ikohi has called for an ad hoc Komnas HAM team to find out what Suharto’s role was during the 1997-1998 period when people went missing. This team can begin by summoning TNI (Indonesian Military) and police elements suspected of being involved in the abductions. “Komnas HAM had made such a promise. We also appeal to all Indonesians who respect justice not to pardon Suharto before there is an honest and fair trial,” said Mugi, before the former President passed away.

Tempo Magazine
No. 23/VIII
February 05-11, 2008

Cover Story

Thousands of people were mysteriously shot to death in 1983, their corpses dumped in the streets. Were the ‘executions’ committed by the state?

ON the night of June 26, 1983, in Lubuk Pakam, 40 kilometers from Medan, at a dim distance, Suwito, the owner of two food stalls in the village, saw five people approaching him. They asked Suwito to follow them as they needed his information.

Unsuspecting, Suwito got into the white Land Rover of the men picking him up. In the car, they asked him about Usman Bais, a notorious robber and gang leader from Medan who had once eaten at his stall. Suwito denied any relationship with the burglar, let alone the accusation that Usman Bais had supplied capital for the food stall.

As Suwito recounted, he was taken round the suburbs of Medan for two hours. He was photographed twice. He was dropped off at Hamparan Perak village, followed by one of the men. “The man was of average build, upright, but a bit crippled,” said Suwito.

As soon as this lame man got out, he pulled his pistol. “I heard three shots before I fell. I could still hear the other man telling him to shoot me in the head. But the shooter said that I was already dead, after groping around my belly,” added Suwito. He was actually holding his breath, pretending to be dead. Suwito was then dumped into a roadside ditch.

In 1983, such scenes became common all over Indonesia and were later known as Petrus (for penembak misterius, mysterious shooters) incidents. At that time, people in Jakarta and other major cities in Indonesia were becoming accustomed to the sights of scattered dead bodies. However, they didn’t have the slightest idea of who had perpetrated the shootings.

The government was at first reluctant to clarify the number of so many deaths. Security authorities also denied involvement. Then Armed Forces commander Gen. L.B. Moerdani said that the killings had occurred following gang wars. The slayings, Benny said, were not a government decision. He admitted that, “Some were gunned down by security men, but it was because they resisted arrest.”

However, in his biography Ucapan, Pikiran, dan Tindakan Saya (My Words, Thoughts and Deeds) Suharto “confirms” the shootings. He said that the mysterious killings were purposely done as shock therapy to reduce the high rate of crime.

“The incidents were not mysterious. The real problem was that the incidents were preceded by public fears,” indicated Suharto, in Chapter 69 of his biography. Some evil people, he said, had acted beyond the limits of humanity norms. “So, we had to initiate some treatment, some stern action,” he pointed out.”What kind of action? Well, we had to resort to force. But it was not just execution by shootings. No! Those who resisted had to be shot. They were gunned down because they fought back,” explained Suharto in the biography.

No official figures of the shooting victims were ever reported. Until July 1983, according to Benny Moerdani, 300 corpses were recorded throughout Indonesia. The number must have been larger because many criminal elements vanished without a trace.

Mulyana W. Kusumah, a criminologist who researched the Petrus incident, said that the number of shooting victims could be as high as 2,000. Hans van den Broek, then Foreign Minister of The Netherlands, in 1984 requested the Indonesian government to respect human rights, putting the total of victims even higher at 3,000.

Many years later the government’s involvement in the mysterious killings began to be unveiled. Mulyana’s research showed that Petrus constituted a continuation of the Anti-Crime Operation in several major cities.

At first, the operation was announced by Yogyakarta’s garrison commander, Lt. Col. M. Hasbi, in March 1983.

It was followed by other areas, including Jakarta. Some of the thousands of gali, ­as thugs were called, ­were shot, some of them readily surrendered, others fled to hide in the jungle. A few changed their evil ways.

The government regarded the decision to “organize” the Petrus operation as something positive. Criminal activities werereported to decline following the Petrus operation. InYogyakarta, cases of violent crime dropped from 57 to 20 fromJanuary to June 1983. During the same period, the number of crimes in Semarang decreased from 78 to 50.

But this mysterious method of addressing the problem of the high crime rate invited criticism. Mulyana concluded his study by describing the obscure shooting incidents as “extralegal,” which was contrary to the principle of law and justice. The Legal Aid Institute, then headed by Adnan Buyung Nasution, referred to the Petrus operation as “premeditated murder.”

Tempo Magazine
No. 23/VIII
February 05-11, 2008

Cover Story

Suharto’s leadership was marked by a strong level of personal subjectivity. He created an Indonesia which was ‘prosperous,’ centralistic, and respected, without paying attention to matters of democracy or human rights. Things began to fall apart for him when his children became aggressive in business.

JAKARTA 1966. Sukarno, who had led the country for six years under the confusion known as “Guided Democracy,” had been replaced by a handsome and taciturn military man. He held a powerful mandate known as the Supersemar letter.

Since that point, for decades to come, and even after his body was buried at Astana Giribangun, Solo, on Monday last week, this soft-spoken major-general continues to stir up the nation. Yes, Suharto (1921-2008) is not finished just yet.

There is a nostalgia which makes people yearn for the stability which he brought in the past. Here in the present democracy has led to waves of uncertainty: the emergence of small kings in the provinces, the cackle of freedom of expression, and opportunists who dominate the halls of power. His unwavering doctrine of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and intolerance of regional aspirations suddenly seemed like a viable alternative when separatism began to appear in Sumatra, Maluku, Papua, and other parts of the country.

How was he able to permeate the very being of this country?

Of course, during his 32 years in power, Suharto had plenty of opportunities to do good and bad-which he did, alternately. However, there was a process which seemed to go on forever under his administration, the length of which could only be outdone by Cuba’s Fidel Castro. This process was centralization, and even personalization, with figurehead Suharto as the nucleus of the entire nation.

It is not unusual that cultural observers have often compared his so-called New Order rule with the Javanese kingdom of Mataram-a political system which places the king as the center, one which draws its power from the cosmos. The king is a supernatural figure. In Javanese tradition, as Benedict Anderson wrote in his classic book The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture, legitimacy does not come from man. With her supernatural powers, a queen can subdue the people around her. Suharto, whether he realized it or not, appeared to be convinced that he was that central point.

This centralization process might have been detected early on, when he reduced the number of political parties-those pockets of power outside the government which were a remnant of the liberal democracy which had been paralyzed by Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. As Herbert Feith wrote in The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, in the 1971 General Election, the scores of political parties were reduced to just 10. All of the election regulations were made to serve one goal: a victory for the Golkar Party. At that time, his democratic supporters, including the university students from the Class of ‘66 who had taken Sukarno out of office, did not suspect a thing. “We knew he was a military man who did not like politics,” said Arief Budiman, an activist.

These lovers of democracy were intrigued, and placed many of their hopes on his shoulders. Suharto released political prisoners and allowed newspapers banned by Sukarno to start publishing again. The New Order quickly “transformed” into a correction of the Old Order; and Suharto himself became a correction of Sukarno. He broke from the government model which was fond of chanting slogans, one which busied itself with shouts of “Crush Malaysia!” while allowing inflation to rise 600 percent. A program of development was spelt out and inflation brought under control, and Indonesia began an impressive period of economic growth. Foreign capital flowed into the country.

However, the elimination of power outside of the nucleus of the New Order did not come to a halt. An incident in the mid-1970s led to the following consolidation: 10 political parties were
reduced to two parties and one group. The Malari incident (1974) was a protest against the government, which was planning to implement the idea of Tien Suharto, namely the Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Theme Park (TMII), which began to show signs of corruption. This time, opposition from students met with an iron fist. The government, which had been tolerant and open, turned violent and repressive. Several years later, from 1978-1979, frontal opposition from university students was answered with the NKK/BKK-a ban on political activity for students on campus.

In the 1980s, this centralization of power, which went on during that entire period, had reached a rather frightening stage: the nucleus had widened. The children of President Suharto, who had started to grow up, became an integral part of the central body, going into business armed with “special privileges” from their father. One edition of Forbes magazine reported that, after the monetary crisis in 1997, the wealth of Suharto and his family had reached US$16 billion.

In his lengthy memoir entitled, From Third World to First, former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew wrote how he did not understand why his children needed to become so wealthy. In the same book, Lee regretted that Suharto had ignored the advice of former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, General Benny Moerdani, at the end of the 1980s, namely that he curb the zeal of his children to obtain various business privileges.

According to Kuntowijoyo, as quoted by Eriyanto in the book Kekuasaan Otoriter (Authoritative Power), Suharto was the type of person who based himself on acts of faith and not on acts of reason. Because of this, many of Suharto’s statements and actions were sur rising, yet he never doubted himself in making decisions. He did not need any rational considerations when disbanding the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). He just relied on his personal convictions. A biography compiled by O. G. Roeder shows how confident Suharto felt when he filled the vacuum in army leadership. “I acted upon my own convictions.”

It seems that it was this self-confidence which led him to launch the “Petrus” operation, the mysterious shootings to exterminate thugs. This staunch attitude may also have been the basis of his decision to take drastic action which claimed many victims in Aceh, Tanjung Priok, Lampung, Papua, and other places. This dark record of human rights violations cannot
easily be effaced.

The height of this centralization rife with nepotism was most transparent in 1997: he was elected for the seventh time, which means that he had spent almost half of his life as Indonesia’s President. In the 7th Development Cabinet, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana,  his eldest daughter, was appointed as Minister of Social Affairs. And when it was seen that the scope of the authority given to this minister was quite extensive, people began imagining that the handover of power would be a family event: the eldest daughter taking her father’s role.

Indeed, Suharto’s style was centralistic, prone to nepotism, and often repressive. However, this was also the way in which programs of national prosperity were able to succeed-and in the end this created a populist image. Indonesia in the Soeharto Years: Issues, Incidents and Images, is a book containing a collection of writings discussing this period, citing the success of Family Planning, a program which began in 1970 and was based solely on economic considerations. Suharto believed that each child needed food, clothing, and education; these needs could not be met if the country experienced a population boom.

The implementation of the Family Planning program was top-down and did not originate from public aspirations. With Tien Suharto at the top of the organizational chart, and the support of the wives of the highest leaders in the provinces, the bureaucratic machine mobilized the Family Planning program down to the most remote villages. Some of the program’s repressive measures led
to some bitter experiences, even though the world saw it as a noteworthy achievement.

After such an extended stay in power, Suharto and a small circle of close friends and family grew to become the group primarily responsible for the various social and economic indicators in the country: repression, the success of the model of prosperity, horrifying levels of corruption, and the destruction of the economy due to the monetary crisis of 1997-1998.

On Sunday last week, his long life finally ended, but his exploits-whether those from long ago or those yet to be revealed-constitute a legacy which continues to haunt Indonesia.

Tempo Magazine
No. 23/VIII
February 05-11, 2008

HE was accorded seven days of mourning, flags at half-mast. Whether one approved or disapproved of the government’s action, Suharto died a ‘hero’ last week. From the time he was admitted to Pertamina Hospital until his burial in Solo three weeks later, Suharto proved he was a master manipulator.

A stream of senior officials came to visit him. The attention given to the fluctuating condition of his organs overshadowed other news-like the death of Slamet, a smalltime snack-seller, who lost all hope and killed himself over the soaring price of soybeans. All television stations-some of them owned by Suharto’s children-aimed their cameras at the hospital or repeatedly showed footage of the ailing former President. Of course, out of respect for a seriously ill man, they only showed the good parts.

At the hospital, the family applied a strict protocol: only people they approved of were allowed in. Not all of Suharto’s former inner circle passed the screening process. Harmoko, who never forgot to ask directions from his boss while he was Information Minister, failed to get in. Neither did B.J. Habibie, the former President who always used to refer to Suharto as his mentor. Amid the chorus of politicians calling for Suharto to be pardoned, the man himself was not prepared to forgive his two former associates.

When he finally breathed his last, broadcasters brimming with tears recalled his goodness and his achievements. The endless eulogies got better ratings than the soap operas. This meant increased advertising. It is fair to say that use of television to influence the feelings of the public was largely successful.

In an obvious about-face, television channels showed a man who deserved nothing less than prayers and expressions of sympathy. If there were people who spoke otherwise, or referred to his sins or wrongdoings, they were seen to be misled, ignorant, given to prattling or harboring grudges. Perhaps Asep Purnama Bahtiar is right. The Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta University lecturer claimed that media reports were no longer factual. They were, he argued, a reconstruction of a “world” envisaged by the media and the people involved.

Soon, Astana Giribangun, the Suharto family mausoleum, will cease to be in the news. We will be left with the pending civil case against Suharto’s foundations and the debate over the legal status of his heirs. The government should not waste time worrying about that. The rules are quite clear. Unless Suharto’s six children reject the terms of his will, they stand to inherit all his possessions. It would not make sense for any of them to reject their inheritance. The Attorney General’s Office could then deal with the children on the basis of the civil case.

The case against Suharto himself automatically lapses upon his death, but his cronies who survive him must be examined. All the government has to do is determine which of Suharto’s policies represented an abuse of power, were unlawful or were used to enrich himself and his associates. Anybody who benefited from these policies should immediately become the target of an investigation. No one should be allowed to evade this. They did nothing to refuse the fruits of the privileges they enjoyed so cheerfully.

There are many ways in which the government can do this if it has the will to do so. One is to audit the wealth of the cronies. Assets procured through privilege or are of uncertain origin can be examined in court. In principle, enjoying the benefits of illegal policies is a crime in itself. The evidence is clear. Secret documents from the US State Department and the White House can be used as additional evidence to prove corruption during the New Order years.

The public will wait and see if once in court the cronies deny responsibility by pinning the blame for all wrongdoings on Suharto, a man they now praise because he gave them so many “sweeteners.” Only a true coward would “stab” a boss who is already in the next world.

Above all, the cronies must be investigated if the government really wants to uphold economic justice and carry out its constitutional mandate to guarantee the right of all citizens to equal opportunity. If it does nothing, the special facilities and privileges thought to have been wrongfully obtained will never end. Only a puppet kingdom would allow this sorry state of
affairs to continue.

The government should prioritize these investigations, if only because the move has already been mandated by the People’s Consultative Assembly in 1999. Resolving these cases is more important than spending time thinking about declaring Suharto a national hero-as loudly proposed by Priyo Budi Santoso, a Golkar functionary who was once summoned by the Corruption Eradication
Commission.

Tempo Magazine
No. 23/VIII
February 05-11, 2008

Cover Story

Suharto used the military approach to deal with the Aceh and Papua conflicts, resulting in thousands of victims.

THERE was a time when Zarkani (not his real name) would ask everyone he met endless questions about his missing father. “Where is my father? Has my father died? If he did, where was he buried?” He kept on asking until about two years ago. Then the questions stopped.

Born in 1969, Zarkani has been traumatized since the age of 20, when his father was summoned to appear at the Krueng ABRI (Armed Forces) HQ in Pase, North Aceh. The Suharto government had designated Aceh as a Military Operations Zone (DOM). That was the last time anyone saw Zarkani’s father. He never returned home. It clearly affected Zarkani’s mental state. Once, Zarkani was found in a local mosque courtyard, playing in a pool of sacrificial goat’s blood, shouting, “This is my father’s blood.” At other times, he would build a mound of earth in his house’s yard, saying, “This is my father’s grave.”

Thousands of children in the land of Seulawah (Aceh) have gone through the same trauma as Zarkani. They wait for their fathers to come home. Days, weeks, months and years pass, but there has never been any news of their fates.

The military operations that lasted until 1998 began in early 1989 when about 300 Libya-trained armed members of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) returned to Aceh. Equipped with a specific ideology and weaponry, the GAM army attacked military and police posts in the area. The GAM’s guerrilla war against the government had begun.

The attacks began in Syantalura. A policeman guarding the Arun oil and gas refinery located in North Aceh was enjoying the morning air when suddenly a group of armed men stormed the  premises, firing at the police post. “A bullet hit a corporal,” said Ramli Ridwan, a former North Aceh Regent.

Fighting between the Indonesian Armed Forces and GAM rebels had been going on since Acehnese leader Tengku Hasan Tiro declared the formation of GAM on December 4, 1976. Indonesian security forces counterattacked. Seven years later, Tiro and other GAM leaders fled to Sweden. The movement was taken over by a younger generation of Acehnese, trained in Libya.

The critical situation led Aceh Governor Ibrahim Hasan to assemble regents and public figures as well as local military chiefs under the Korem 011/Lilawangsa, in Lhok Seumawe. They decided to take the matter to Jakarta. President Suharto immediately deployed 6,000 members of the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus) to Aceh. Some 12,000 troops were to remain there until May, 1990. The operation was codenamed Operation Red Snafrie. Officers who led operations there were Sjafrie Sjamsoedin, Prabowo Subianto and Syarwan Hamid.

The military approach operation was typically Suharto’s way of dealing with regional conflicts. This method was applied to suppress rebellion in Papua. Since the December 1, 1969 referendum (Pepera) which validated the transfer of West Papua from The Netherlands to Indonesia, many Papuans were unhappy. They claim that the Dutch East Indies government had promised to give the Papuans independence.

On July 28, 1965, long before the referendum, a number of Papuan leaders, such as Ferry Awom, had proclaimed Papuan independence in Manokwari. They recruited Biak youths to wage guerrilla warfare. One of the strong guerrilla groups of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) was the Mandacan group.

Suharto ‘dealt with’ the security problem in Indonesia’s easternmost province by continuing to reinforce military troops. Former Cenderawasih Military Region commander, Maj. Gen. (ret) Samsuddin, who was assigned to his post in 1975, reported: “Toward the 1977 general elections, the situation in Papua was very tense. The troops had to secure certain areas during the elections.”

History notes that guns, mortars and blood did not succeed in restoring peace in Papua and Aceh. In Aceh, thousands of women and children were traumatized by the effects of the war. The National Human Rights Commission fact-finding team reports that during the DOM (in Aceh) period, some 3,000 women became widows and 20,000 children were orphaned-some of whom like Zarkani, have lost their sanity. Some women were raped.

It is the same story in Papua. Sociologist and anti-Pepera activist, Arnold Clemens A.P., was shot dead. As many as 10,000 Papuans took refuge in neighboring Papua New Guinea.

Papua continues to smolder. History has noted the bloody tracksof military boots in the two regions

Tempo Magazine
No. 23/VIII
February 05-11, 2008
Cover Story

Attempts to bring to trial cases of human rights violations during the 1965 tragedy still have a long way to go. Suharto somehow managed to remain out of the justice system’s reach.

SVETLANA, the eldest child of Nyoto, said she wanted to see Suharto prosecuted for the 1965 tragedy. The daughter of then-Deputy Chairman II of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) Central Committee, has never joined groups of G30S (September 30 Movement) victims’ families who are fighting the government. “I know these charges are important, but I’m pessimistic about the outcome,” she said.

According to Svetlana, her mother, Sutarni, also expects the same. But Ibu Nyoto, now 79, harbors no grudge against Suharto. In fact, she added: “Some of mother’s friends are so angered that they get sick when they hear Suharto’s exemption from prosecution.” The Nyoto family is an example of a G30S victimliving without any of the traumatic scars. Sutarni recalls how she was forced to carry her children, moving from one detention house to another, trying not to lose her sense of humor. They have no idea when and where Nyoto was killed, let alone his burial place.

Not all the G30S injured parties share the attitude of the Nyotos. Perhaps it is because the tragedy which took place 43 years ago involved a great number of people. Around 3 million people died, over 10,000 were exiled to Buru Island and millions more received discriminating treatment. The New Order, led by Suharto, created instruments that legitimized atrocities against suspected communists at that time.

Exiling over 10,000 people to Buru, for instance, was meant to safeguard the newly established regime in order to win the 1971 general elections, the first of the New Order era. The provisional government replacing President Sukarno should have organized the elections in 1968. But since Suharto, who was then responsible for security, ­was unprepared, the elections were postponed.

Banishing those classified as Group “B” prisoners to Buru Island was validated by a letter from the Security & Order Restoration Operation Commander, No. KEP 009/KOPKAM/2/1969, signed by Maraden Panggabean on behalf of Suharto. The Attorney General complemented it by issuing another rule to “legalize” the detention on Buru from 1969 to 1979.

Meanwhile, the Group “C” prisoners, or those seen to have been influenced by leftist ideology, received additional ‘punishment’ after they were released into society. For instance, they were banned from becoming civil servants, legislators, and even from taking part in elections. The government made standard rules to justify the discrimination, such as the Home Affairs Minister’s Instruction No. 32/1981, prohibiting people directly or indirectly involved in the G30S from serving as civil servants, soldiers, the clergy, and teachers.

The question that remains unanswered: was Suharto guilty of the 1965 tragedy? After the reforms began, victims of this political tragedy actually made legal attempts to prosecute the government, rather than Suharto directly,­ to seek redress, rehabilitation and compensation. But all these attempts went nowhere.

The National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) also formed a team to investigate the forced exile of thousands to Buru as a serious violation of human rights. M.M. Billah, a member of Komnas HAM, set up a team and submitted a proposal. But it turned out that the methodology of inquiry Billah offered was not approved by the House of Representatives (DPR) in mid-2004.

According to Billah, the charges against Suharto in the rights infringement case on Buru Island can be revived if seven out of Komnas HAM’s 20 members agreed.

“But it doesn’t guarantee that the investigation will proceed because the approval of the DPR again has to be sought,” said Billah. He acknowledged that it was very difficult to bring cases of serious rights abuse on Buru Island to court. “All relevant parties have their own self-interest,” he added, trying to explain. It is, in fact, such a portrayal that leads people
like Svetlana to be pessimistic.